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The Right of Self-Determination in the
Twenty-First Century
Hurst Hannum*

I. Introduction
One can address the right of self-determination from a number of different perspectives. For example, the exercise of this right in the past decade has
had a dramatic effect on theories of international organizations, the role of
force, and conflict resolution. Claims of self-determination led in part to the
destruction of the former Yugoslavia, and the specter of secessionist movements has magnified the attention given to the rights of minorities and indigenous peoples.
In the following discussion, I will link self-determination to human rights
in two different ways. First, I explore self-determination as a human right,
addressing issues of content and definition. Second, I discuss the impact of
self-determination claims on other human rights.
I. Self-Determination as a Human Right
Self-determination is a human right. Although there are many hortatory
references to self-determination in General Assembly resolutions and elsewhere, the only legally binding documents in which the right of self-determination is proclaimed are the two international covenants.' The first paragraph
of common article 1 states: "All peoples have the right of self-determination.
By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely
pursue their economic, social and cultural development."2
Although the quoted language fails to answer several questions, at least
some aspects ofthe right have become clear through subsequent reflection and
* Professor of International Law, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts
University.
1. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 1, 999
U.N.T.S. 171; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16,1966,

art. 1, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
2. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supranote I, art. 1; International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 1, art. 1.
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interpretation. The first clarification is that self-determination is a right that
belongs to collectivities known as "peoples," not to individuals. Thus, the
Human Rights Committee has consistently made clear that claims that the
right of self-determination has been violated cannot be raised under the First
Optional Protocol, which applies only to individuals.3 I think that the Committee is probably wrong to exclude self-determination claims automatically
from the scope of individual complaints, but its jurisprudence has been consistent on this point.
It also is clear that self-determination is a right that belongs to peoples,
but not to minorities.4 This truism may only shift the debate to definitions and
semantics, but the distinction between minorities and peoples remains an
article of faith for states and international bodies concerned with monitoring
human rights.
There are numerous problems in defining both "peoples" and what they
are entitled to "determine." Without reviewing the entire history of selfdetermination, let me just outline how the concept has passed through at least
two distinct phases and is now entering athird one.' Initially, meaning perhaps
the middle of the nineteenth century when the phrase "self-determination"
came into common usage, self-determination was not a right but was a principle. It was a principle that first allowed disparate people who spoke the same
language, such as Germans and Italians, to group themselves together and
form a new state. This "grouping," of course, did not occur without coercion
and, in some cases, a good deal of violence. A bit later, at the end of World
Warn, the principle ofself-determination provided aguidingprinciple orrationale for dismembering the defeated Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires.
As a political principle, but not a right under international law, selfdetermination in this period was subject to many limitations. The most
obvious limitation, consistentwith realpolitikconcerns, was that the successful exercise of self-determination required the support of the victorious
powers if there had been a war or the support of major powers even absent a
war. Philosophically, "external" self-determination or independence would
be rejected if the resulting state would not be economically and politically
viable. Self-serving political restrictions made the principle ofself-determination applicable to Europe, for instance, but not to colonial empires; thus to
Poland, but not to Ireland.
3. See, e.g., Human Rights Committee's General Comment 23 on art. 27 (50th Sess.
1994), reprintedin Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations adopted
by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRIIGEN/1/Rev. 3 (1997), 3.1, at 39.
4. See id.
5. For further discussion of the phases, see generally Hurst Hannum, Rethinking SelfDetermination,34 VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (1993).
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Following a somewhat confused period between the two world wars, the
adoption of the United Nations Charter in 1945 marked the beginning of the
second phase. This second phase began, as did the first phase, by identifying
self-determination as a principle rather than as a right.6 Self-determination
was proclaimed in a manner that did not necessarily require the dismemberment of colonial empires; if it had included such an understanding, Britain,
France, and Belgium simply would not have adhered to the Charter. Yet, at
the same time, use of the word "peoples" must have implied that self-determination meant more than simply a reaffirmation of the sovereign equality of
states.
This situation gradually changed, and I think that one of the great contributions of the United Nations to international law was in promoting the shift
from proclaiming a principle of self-determination in the Charter to recognizing a rightof self-determination some twenty years later. The problem is that,
during this transition, the United Nations continued to refer rhetorically to the
right of all peoples to self-determination, when what it really meant was the
right of colonial territories to independence.' And those are two very different
concepts.
Self-determination from 1960 on, at least as articulated by the United
Nations, had nothing to do with ethnicity, language, or culture. Although
there were some exceptions - the division of British India, Rwanda-Urundi,
and a few others - the accepted mantra was that colonial territories would
become independent. It did not matter how many "peoples" were found
within them, although obviously each contained many different peoples,
nations, and ethnic groups. Thus, in general, territories, not peoples, enjoyed
the right to independence.
It was also clear during this period that,although there were other theoretical options - for example, Hawaii and Alaska exercised their right to selfdetermination by becoming part of the United States - the international
preference was for independence. This result could, and often was, achieved
with only minimal preparation or even consultation with the colony concerned, although any option other than independence, such as free association
or full integration, required the full and informed consent of the people
involved.'
6. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 1(2), 55 (discussing "respect for the principle of equal rights
and self-determination of peoples").
7. See, e.g., Declarationon the Grantingof Independence to Colonial Countriesand
Peoples,G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684
(1960) (discussing independence of colonial countries and peoples).
8. See Principles Which Should Guide Members in Determining Whether or Not an
Obligation Exists to Transmit the Information CalledFor Under Article 73e of the Charter,
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Thus, in the second half of the twentieth century, a territorial right to
independence for former colonies replaced the nineteenth century principle of
allowing ethnic, linguistic, or religious groups to form various kinds of
political units that might or might not become independent states. In the postcolonial period,9 what I would identify as the third phase of self-determination, some are attempting to join those two principles in order to create a new
right in international law: the right of every people - defined ethnically,
culturally, or religiously - to have its own independent state.
Although this new position has its adherents, it is clear that international
law has not yet recognized such a new paradigm. One reason for this is that,
because practically all of the world's surface is now divided among sovereign
states, self-determination defined as the right to create a new state would necessarily imply a right to secession. However, no state, no foreign ministry, and
very few disinterested writers or scholars suggest that every people has the
right to a state, and they implicitly or explicitly reject a right to secession."
This is the current state of international law, whether one is talking about
popular groups like Tibetans or unpopular groups like Tamils in Sri Lanka.
There simply is no right of secession under international law, nor has there
been even preliminary agreement on the criteria that might be used in the
future to determine when secession should be supported. Of course, there is
no prohibition in international law against secession, either. If a country
disintegrates as the result of a civil war, international law poses no barrier to
recognition of the two or more succeeding states. That is, however, a quite
different position than recognizing the right of a group to secede from an
existing state.
Cementing the world's frontiers forever is an overly conservative position, however, and I would like to suggest at least two exceptions to the noright-to-secession rule that I articulate. The first exception would recognize
a right of secession when there have been massive and discriminatory human
rights violations that approach genocide. The violations need not constitute
genocide under the technical definition of that term, but I do believe that they
must be both massive and discriminatory. So-called "cultural genocide," for
example, in which a culture may be radically affected by modernization or by
a surrounding dominant culture but not otherwise subjected to human rights
G.A. Res. 1541 (XV), U.N. GAOR, 4th Comm., 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 29-30, U.N. Doc.
A/4684 (1960).
9. There are today only 17 non-self-governing territories recognized by the United
Nations, most of which are small islands controlled by the United Kingdom or the United
States.
10. See, e.g., Hurst Hannum, The Specter ofSecession: Respondingto ClaimsforEthnic
Self-Determination,77 FOREIGNAFF., Mar./Apr. 1998, at 13, 16.
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violations, would notjustify secession. Rather, this category seeks to provide
a remedy in those rare situations in which there is an explicit attempt to
destroy a culture or people. One could argue, although one would have to
look at the facts very closely, that the repression ofKurds in Iraq and conceivably Tibetans might be among the situations that would fall into this exception.
The other and more difficult exception might arise when a group, community, or region has been systematically excluded from political and economic power or when a minimum level of minority rights or a reasonable
demand for self-government has been consistently denied. I want to emphasize that this exception would not apply when a central government refuses to
agree to whatever the minority or the region wants. Rather, it would apply
only when the central government has been so intransigent that, for example,
it refuses to allow the minority to speak its own language, it excludes minority
members from participation in the parliament, or it refuses to accede to
demands for minimal local or regional power-sharing.
Leaving aside these two possible exceptions to the rule, I now return to
the basic proposition that self-determination today does not mean either
independence or secession. If that is correct, is there any reason that we still
talk about self-determination as a human right? Is there anything left of it?
I would suggest that there is. What is left - the contemporary content of selfdetermination - reflects the right's position in the two covenants and offers
an opportunity to ensure that it continues to have meaning and validity into the
next century.
Here, too, I am suggesting what the law should be, rather than describing
what I think it is at present. First, we should keep in mind that self-determination, except in the narrow context of decolonization, is not absolute. This
point should not be surprising, because there are very few absolute rights.
Recognizing that one has a right to self-determination does not imply that one
can always exercise the right to its maximum extent any more than exercising
the right to free expression means that one is absolutely free to say whatever
one wants under all conceivable circumstances.
I suggest that we can find meaningful content to self-determination by
looking at two other human rights, or at least aspects of two human rights, on
which there is a much greater degree of consensus than is the case if one
focuses on self-determination per se. These related rights are as follows:
(1) the protection of the cultural, religious, linguistic, and ethnic identity of
individuals and groups; and (2) the right of individuals and groups to participate effectively in the economic and the political life of the country.
Protecting the identity of groups is not very popular in the United States
or in some other countries, such as Sweden. It is clear, however, that, particu-
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larly during the past decade, greater attention is being given to the issues of
minority and indigenous rights, reflecting what I believe is a consensus on the
importance of preserving one's identity both as an individual and as a member
of a group. Related to this is a growing consensus that diversity and pluralism
are, in themselves, worthwhile goals to pursue. Thus, there is room to include
protection of identity in a contemporary understanding of self-determination.
The second aspect, participation, is derived to some extent from economic development discussions, in which the right of popular participation in
decision-making was identified as a way of ensuring that assistance received
by states would better serve the purpose for which it was intended. This
concept was extraordinarily subversive, because, once one effectively participates in economic decision-making, a need to participate effectively in all
sorts of other decision-making processes almost inevitably follows.
More recently, the belief that a new democratic era has arrived has
reinforced this notion of participation." Participation, however, goes beyond
democracy. 2 Determining what is and what is not effective participation is,
of course, difficult. Ensuring participation opens up a whole range of possibilities, ranging from representation in the central government to different
forms of federalism, consociationalism, and autonomy. As a principle, however, it is not inherently less manageable than due process or fair trial, even
if the answer to whether the people in a particular region or group participate
effectively in governing themselves, both through the central government and
locally, is not always immediately apparent. The idea of effective participation identifies another component of self-determination that should not be
overly threatening to the states that are expected to implement it.
A final suggestion in defining self-determination for the twenty-first
century is to impose a limit or a price on its exercise by requiring that any
ethnic group that succeeds in establishing a new state based on principles of
ethnicity, religion, language, or culture should be willing to grant to other
groups within the new state the same right of self-determination and secession
that it has just exercised. Pursuant to this principle, Serbs would have had a
right to secede from Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina, and Crees would be
able to leave an independent Quebec. Such a principle might cause potential
11. Compare,e.g., Gregory H. Fox, The Right to PoliticalParticipationin International
Law, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 539 (1992), and Thomas M. Franck, The EmergingRight to DemocraticGovernance,86 AM. J. INT'L L. 46 (1992), with Robert D. Kaplan, Was DemocracyJusta
Moment?, ATLANTICMONTHLY, Dec. 1997, at 55, 55, andFareed Zakaria, The Rise ofIlliberal
Democracy, 76 FOREIGN AFF., Nov./Dec. 1997, at 22.
12. 1 remain disturbed by the fact that the Clinton Administration decided to rename the
Bureau of Human Rights the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. This suggests
that neither democracy nor labor is included in human rights or that democracy and labor are
somehow more important than human rights. Both are dangerous positions to maintain.
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secessionists to think more carefully about the consequences of their actions
and would give newly trapped minorities a way out without resorting to
violence.
Even with, or perhaps because of, the exceptions and the nuances I
outline, self-determination as a human right remains relatively vague. Unfortunately, it is unlikely that any existing human rights mechanism or even a
new mechanism will be of much assistance in defining the right in the foreseeable future, because few states are willing to allow an international forum to
judge a situation that might, if a claim to self-determination and secession is
upheld, result in the destruction of the state itself. Some things are too important to be left to lawyers, and I think that self-determination might be one of
those issues.
III Impact of Self-Determination Claims on OtherHuman Rights
The situation in Kosovo and recent statements by the U.S. House of
Representatives and Secretary of State Madeline Albright demanding that
Serbia recognize the "legitimate rights" of the people of Kosovo raise several
questions: What are those rights? Do they have anything to do with human
rights? Does the United States support the political goal of an independent
Kosovo or a Kosovo united with Albania? Do Kosovo Albanians have a right
to autonomy? Do they have a right to return to the status they enjoyed in
Yugoslavia in 1989, even though we certainly are not returning anything else
to its 1989 position? The obvious danger is that, whenever self-determination
is involved, a destructive confusion of political goals, basic human rights
norms, and humanitarian issues may make it more difficult to deal with any
of these aspects successfully. 3
The other potential impact of self-determination claims is to encourage
violent conflict. Although it is a truism, it needs to be reiterated that more
human rights are violated during wars than at any other time. Ifpolicymakers
do not arrive at a better understanding of how to respond to claims for selfdetermination, such claims are likely to increase. It is very likely that the
number of violent conflicts will increase as well, and increased conflict will
have a direct impact on the entire gamut of international human rights.
At the same time, I think that if we reverse the lens and look at "ordinary"
human rights first, and if we can imagine that all the human rights that we
want to have protected are protected, violence is much less likely to ensue.
Disputes over self-determination will not disappear, but they will be resolved
13. For further discussion of these issues, see Hurst Hannum, Whose Rights in Kosovo,
andJust What Rights? It is Unclear What is Being DemandedofSerbia,BOsTON GLOBE, Apr.
5, 1998, at D2.
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by countries such as Canada, the United Kingdom, and Belgium, as opposed
to being decided by countries such as Russia or Yugoslavia. If one creates a
genuinely democratic rights-respecting regime, it is less likely that people will
want to leave it. If, however, they do leave it, it is also more likely that any
separation will occur peacefully.
This approach suggests that, even when self-determination is purportedly
the issue, it is better to try to address denials of human rights before trying to
address the denial of so-called self-determination. As a practical matter, a
nongovernmental organization or human rights activist is more likely to be
able to influence a government by focusing on respect for human rights than
by entering the quagmire of self-determination and secession. I think that one
is also more likely to protect what we would all agree are human rights - for
example, physical integrity, use of language, and protection of culture without confusing those rights with political goals. Even if we may share
some of the latter goals, it is essential to keep them distinct from the universally recognized and legally articulated provisions of international human
rights law.
IV. Conclusion
For better or for worse, self-determination will not disappear as an issue
that has the potential to create serious conflict in the future. Self-determination is not a new issue, however. Self-determination claims did not start at the
end of the Cold War, as numerous conflicts in Africa and Asia remind us. But
we do need to guard against the usurpation of the slogan and the symbol of
self-determination and its use as a purely partisan political tool by both
governments and disaffected groups. Because self-determination is such an
emotional concept, appeals by "ethnic entrepreneurs" are always likely to
create an atmosphere in which violence and greater violations of human rights
are more, rather than less, likely. This position may be relatively conservative, but I believe that it is a solid human rights position.
As the immortal Mick Jagger said, "You can't always get what you
want/You can't always get what you14want/But if you try sometimes/You just
might find/You get what you need.

14. ROLLING STONES, You Can't Always Get What You Want, on LET IT BLEED (Decca
Records 1969).

